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It’s All Your Fault
Understanding the U.S. – Al Qaeda Conflict
Jeffrey Gagnon, May 2003
Introduction
Writing about the psychological dynamics of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Rouhana and Bar-Tal acknowledge the
unlikelihood of resolution due to the current clash of national
narratives. They write, “The narratives of the two communities in
conflict are in total clash as to the root causes of the conflict, the
meaning of the historical developments, and the role played by the
in-group and the out-group during the various stages of the dispute.”[1]
Elaborating on this point, these authors argue that societal beliefs
about the national narrative allow each side to prolong the conflict
while complicating the possibility for long-term peace.
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the
U.S. - Al Qaeda conflict to explore how each narrative sustains the
conflict and challenges the possibility for peace. Even though Rouhana
and Bar-Tal examine the Palestinian-Israeli struggle as an example of an
intractable ethnonational conflict, many of the characteristics they
highlight also apply to the conflict between the United States and the
fundamentalist Islamic group, Al Qaeda. Various publications from the
United States and the Middle East reveal that each side has created
strong and stubborn societal beliefs about the history, origin and
purpose of the conflict. Each side vilifies the other as evil, unjust
and irresponsible, while perceiving themselves as innocent victims of
aggression and unnecessary violence. While Rouhana and Bar-Tal consider
national narratives to be of chief importance in how each side
constructs societal beliefs, they also consider how each side fashions
the narrative to suit their respective histories, intentions and goals.
These elements strongly frame both the American version and Al Qaeda’s
account of the conflict; therefore, each will be compared through this
analysis.
The two opposing sides in this conflict are
defined as the U.S. government and Al Qaeda. It is important to note
that both the American and Muslim populations have been distinctly
divided over the perspectives and goals of this conflict. Therefore, all
claims attributed to the “American” national narrative will be limited
to the perspective of the U.S. government. With regard to Al Qaeda, its
members are comprised of Wahhabi Muslims who practice a particular form
of Islam. In this investigation, all claims attributed to “Muslims”
refer to Wahhabi Muslims.
In describing any national narrative, sources
that attempt to tell the story play a crucial role. In this case,
principal support for the American version of events is taken from
American media sources and excerpts from the speeches of President Bush.
From the Al Qaeda viewpoint, sources have been taken from Middle Eastern
media journalism translated into English, as well as from excerpts of
interviews given by Osama bin Laden before the events of September 11.
Origin of the Conflict: Al Qaeda Narrative
The origins and perceptions of the goals of the
conflict remains greatly disputed between the two sides. According to
interviews and articles published online at The Middle East Media
Research Institute, Al Qaeda’s narrative claims the attacks on September
11 were caused in part by three main issues. The first issue centers on
an enduring U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, beginning during the
first Gulf War. The second issue results from hypocritical U.S. foreign
policy that has attempted to colonize the Middle East to protect oil
interests. Lastly, Al Qaeda remains angered over U.S. political,
economic and military support of Israeli attacks on innocent Muslims in
Palestine, as well as U.S.–led sanctions against Iraqi civilians after
the Gulf War.
[2]
While these three issues represent the central
concerns of Al Qaeda, the mystery of Al Qaeda’s own history and mission
requires clarification. Who are they, where are they from and what are
their goals? Al Qaeda, sometimes spelled al Qaida, which means “the
Base,” was started in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, who was working to oust
the Soviet army from Afghanistan.[3]
The name reportedly comes from bin Laden’s house in Afghanistan, which
was used as a command post for incoming Muslim fighters reporting to
battle.[4]
Al Qaeda is comprised of Muslims from all over the Middle East and all
over the world. They have been funded, trained and organized by Osama
bin Laden, a former Saudi Arabian citizen who inherited a vast fortune
from his father.[5]
Research on the number of Al Qaeda members has yielded an estimate of
between 2,500 and 3,000, scattered worldwide.[6]
The roots of Al Qaeda’s religious beliefs and
mission can be found in the teachings of Wahhabism, a
fundamentalist form of Islam. Dore Gold, the Israeli author of
Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism,
maintains that the roots of Al Qaeda and the story of 9-11 begin with
the formation of Wahhabism.[7]
According to Gold, Wahhabism is an extreme form of the traditional Islam
practiced widely across the Middle East.[8]
Wahhabi Islam was initiated on the Arabian Peninsula in the
mid-eighteenth century by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.[9]
Retreating to the strictest and most fundamental teachings of Islam, ibn
Abdul Wahhab endorsed violence, murder and war in the name of Islam[10]
Wahhab felt that the Islam of the late eighteenth century was corrupt
and unfaithful to traditional Islamic teachings. Setting the stage for
Al Qaeda’s perception of the U.S., Wahhab saw foreigners, especially
Europeans, as enemies who could potentially dominate the Arabian
Peninsula.[11]
Wahhabism departed from classical Islam, which
forbade the spread of the religion through force.[12]
Wahhabi Islam restored the concept of Jihad (literally, “struggle,” but
now translated as “holy war”) and began a harsh campaign of violence and
war across the peninsula.[13]
Under classical Islam, anyone who died in a Jihad became a shahid,
or martyr (literally, witness) and was instantly welcomed by God into
Paradise.[14]
Throughout its history Wahhabism has been strongly opposed to anyone,
Muslim or non-Muslim, who has not adopted its teachings and principles.[15]
Presently, Wahhabi
fundamentalism is taught at Madinah University in Saudi Arabia.
Madinah graduated fifteen of the Saudis who participated in the
September 11 hijackings, as well as Osama bin Laden.[16]
Thus, Al Qaeda’s members perceive the conflict through the lens of
Wahhabism and view the U.S. not only as political enemies but as
religious ones as well.
Politically, Al Qaeda maintains that the conflict
began in 1989, on the eve of the first Gulf War. The Saudi government
granted the U.S. military permission to construct bases from which to
attack Iraq. Saudi Arabia, fearing an attack from Iraq through Kuwait,
welcomed the U.S. presence as a military protector. Bin Laden and all
Wahhabi clerics denounced this decision, claiming that Western military
forces were invaders and infidels on Holy Land.[17]
In 1996, bin Laden wrote the “Declaration of War Against Americans
Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” subtitled “Expel the
Infidels from the Arabian Peninsula.”[18]
Two years later, in 1998, bin Laden called for a “Jihad Against Jews and
Crusaders.”[19]
He wrote, “For over seven years the United States has been occupying the
lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian peninsula.”[20]
From the Al Qaeda perspective, the U.S. should not have been allowed on
Saudi soil, nor should it have used that position to attack another
Muslim country.
The second cause for war, according to the Al
Qaeda narrative, is American foreign policy in the Middle East.
Outraged, bin Laden lashed out at his perception of American policy as
imperialistic and hypocritical:
The American imposes
himself on everyone… By the testimony of relief workers in Iraq, the
American-led sanctions resulted in the death of more than one million
Iraqi children. All of this is done in the name of American interests…We
believe that the biggest thieves in the world and the terrorists are the
Americans.[21]
The Al Qaeda narrative emotionally positions the
American government as colonialists and political bullies. From Al
Qaeda’s perspective, the U.S. appears to be dominant and imposing.
Afghan Islamic leader Gulboddin Hekmatyar spoke out against U.S. (and
Western) foreign policy in the Middle East, claiming that Westerners
believe their civilization to be superior to all others and will go to
any lengths to achieve that dominance. He wrote, “They are trying to
impose their way of life on the poor peoples.”[22]
Hekmatyar placed the responsibility for this attitude on the American
government and U.S. Congress, claiming that the government hides its
intentions from the American people.[23]
He believes that the U.S. intentionally misrepresents its foreign policy
to its own people. Hekmatyar also implies that the U.S fashions its own
conflict narrative for selfish purposes.
The danger with Al Qaeda’s narrative is that it
positions all of the blame and responsibility on the American
government, which suggests that the conflict can only be resolved if the
American government changes its policies. Furthermore, this narrative
puts Al Qaeda in the position of having to force or coerce the U.S. into
ending the conflict by changing its foreign policy. As such, the
conflict is deepened and the possibility of peace appears remote.
Origin of the Conflict: U.S. Narrative
Rouhana and Bar-Tal insist that the main essence
of an intractable conflict centers on the interpretation of facts as
they pertain to names, rhetoric, main actors, causes and
responsibilities.[24]
While Al Qaeda positions the U.S. as instigators of the conflict, the
American government has constructed a vastly different narrative. To
begin with, the U.S. narrative maintains that the conflict began
on 9-11. Indeed, when President Bush first introduced the nation to the
name “Al Qaeda” in a speech following the attacks, most Americans were
hearing that name for the first time. Moreover, in the days and weeks
following the 9-11 attacks, Americans asked, “Why do they hate us?” As
pointed out by Sardar and Davies in their post-September 11 analysis,
Why Do People Hate America?, the root of this question is more
complex than it seems because it positions America as the victim of
unprovoked violence, rather than as part of a relational conflict.
Several weeks after 9–11, President Bush spoke of foreign animosity
toward the nation: “We must never forget this will be a long struggle,
that there are evil people in the world who hate America.”[25]
But according to Americans, exactly who hates America and why
do they hate? What is the U.S. version of this story?
It is difficult to compile concrete U.S. –
perceived reasons for the attacks of 9-11. Much of the U.S. analysis
stands behind vaguely defined philosophical and political reasons for Al
Qaeda’s attacks, including opposition to freedom, democracy and the U.S.
way of life. Supporting this view, in his September 11 Address to the
Nation, President Bush offered a brief cause for the attacks: “America
was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom
and opportunity in the world.” In a poll conducted by a Paris-based
newspaper, the International Herald Tribune, 90% of U.S.
respondents identified their country’s power and wealth as reasons for
international anger and resentment.[26]
In the same poll, only 18% of U.S. respondents blamed the government’s
foreign policy.[27]
As Sardar and Davies write, “Most Americans are simply not aware of the
impact of their culture and their government’s policies on the rest of
the world. But, more important, a vast majority simply do not believe
that America has done, or can do, anything wrong.”[28]
As pointed out by journalist Daniel Pipes, the
overall vagueness of the opposition only complicates the way Americans
speak about the attacks. Instead of referring to Wahhabi Islam or
militant Islam, the enemies are “terrorists” which, “is a tactic, not an
enemy.”[29]
Leaving the enemy without a name or face, other than the face of Osama
bin Laden, removes the opportunity to learn about Al Qaeda’s cause,
culture, mission and history. Additionally, the vague references to
Islamic extremism or Islamic fundamentalism confuse those Americans who
are unable to differentiate between the many forms of Islam practiced
around the world.
In carrying out the “War on Terror,” the Bush
administration has not offered the American public any specific answers
as to the cause of the attacks. Motives that were widely discussed in
the media in the days and weeks following 9-11 include: disrupting the
American economy, destroying important American governmental and
economic symbols, as well as instilling fear in the hearts and minds of
American citizens. After the attacks, most Americans failed to inquire
as to the social and political ideology of the attackers, while the
government remained silent on this issue. As evidence of this American
mindset, Sardar and Davies lament that the horrific events of 9-11 have
not resulted in a deep and systematic investigation into the causes of
the attacks. They argue that “The events of 9-11 have not prompted
diligent inquiry and serious debate, but a resort to the very agenda
that constructs the problem of relations between America and the rest of
the world in the first place.”[30]
Considering the overall lack of critical inquiry
and the vaguely defined causes of conflict, the U.S. narrative not only
sustains the conflict, it also discourages deeper analysis of the
conflict itself. By maintaining the position that the war began when the
planes were hijacked, Americans indulge in framing themselves
unambiguously as victims of unprovoked violence. This position excludes
the American government from taking any responsibility for the
conflict’s origins, an act that sustains the war itself.
The Opponent has No Legitimacy
Rouhana and Bar-Tal explain that during
intractable conflicts, each side disregards the claims and beliefs of
the other.[31]
By denying the legitimacy of the opposition’s narrative, each side is
able to dehumanize, disregard and negatively label the other. They
contend, “Thus, the opponent is categorized ‘into extreme negative
social categories which are excluded from human groups that are
considered as acting within limits of acceptable norms and/or values’.”[32]
From this perspective, each side is able to justify aggression and
violence while removing itself from blame and responsibility. Instead,
each side can blame the cause and continuation of the conflict on the
opponent.[33]
The use of language plays a major role in this
prolonging this conflict. Each side describes the other as evil.
They also clash regarding the use of the word terrorism. By
vilifying one another using these terms, each side is able to claim
moral superiority and righteousness.
In his September 11 address, President Bush
framed the American narrative in binary terms. “Today, our nation saw
evil, the very worst of human nature…Thousands of lives were suddenly
ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.”[34]
In describing the conflict and subtly justifying retribution, Bush
declared, “This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But
good will prevail.”[35]
By painting the picture of the conflict as “good vs. evil,” President
Bush claimed the moral high ground for the U.S. narrative. This view
also supports the image of Americans as innocent victims of evil acts.
Once again, the U.S. is able to relinquish responsibility for the
conflict. Furthermore, the connotation of evil dehumanizes the
hijackers, Osama bin Laden and all of Al Qaeda. The use of the word evil
suggests irrational hatred and violence. Seen as evil, Al Qaeda is fully
removed from having legitimate political and philosophical reasons for
attacking the U.S. Instead, members of Al Qaeda are reduced to
“evildoers” – those who commit violence only for the sake of
violence.
In a post-9-11 speech, President Bush also shaped
the conflict in rigidly dichotomous terms:
This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom
and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy
it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be
educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We
value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression
can be grounds for execution. We respect people of all faiths and
welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to
think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims.[36]
This description of
the conflict is problematic for a variety of reasons. Once again, the
U.S. is portrayed as morally just, politically fair and democratically
free. In contrast, Al Qaeda is painted in the worst possible terms.
Going even further, President Bush called on America to champion even
higher purposes, declaring,
“We
wage a war to save civilization, itself. We did not seek it, but we must
fight it - and we will prevail.”[37]
Describing Al Qaeda as destroyers of civilization ultimately justifies
any military action the U.S. takes.
As for Al Qaeda’s use
of language in perpetuating the conflict, Abd Al-Bari Atwan, an
Arabic-language journalist based in London and regularly featured on al-Jazeera,
called President Bush, “evil,” “reckless,” and “thirsty for bloodshed.”[38]
Atwan compared Bush to Hitler and implored, “…the entire world must act
to stop him and to put an end to his recklessness, before he drowns in
destructive wars that will make the first and second world wars seem
modest.”[39]
Atwan’s comments mimic President Bush’s, in that they portray Bush as
evil, irrational and unpredictably violent. Comparing Bush to Hitler is
extreme and unfair. However, the intention of the comparison is to
instill fear in the Wahhabi population and to encourage proactive
aggression to avoid destruction. Atwan’s plea also accomplishes the same
goal as Bush’s – he portrays Bush as irrationally violent, thus removing
responsibility for the conflict from the hands of Al Qaeda.
The use of the terrorist label has also
conjured significant debate between the two groups. According to
McCauley and Segal, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter.”[40]
U.S. rhetoric surrounding the attacks continues to label the
perpetrators as terrorists. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda leaders denounce the
label, maintaining that it is a word conjured by the American government
to frame the narrative in its own best interests. In a 1998 interview
with ABC reporter John Miller, Osama bin Laden stated, “Americans accuse
our children in Palestine of being terrorists – those children, who have
no weapons and have not even reached maturity. At the same time,
Americans defend a country, the state of the Jews that has a policy to
destroy the future of these children.”[41]
These comments reflect differences concerning the
definitions of terrorism and terrorist. They also reveal a
frustration with America’s power to define who is a terrorist and which
acts constitute terrorism. The scope of American mass media ensures that
American definitions and labels in this conflict powerfully influence
both narratives. Regardless of the accuracy of the terms, Al Qaeda
leaders are angered by the U.S.’s ability to reframe its own violence
and military aggression in more positive terms. An example of this can
be found in President Bush’s address in October of 2001, “We did not ask
for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today's military
operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms,
but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their
children free from fear.”[42]
Through this statement, Americans are able to perceive retributive acts
of violence in highly moralistic, dignified terms. These clashing
perspectives reinforce the power of language in creating a national
narrative that sustains conflict.
Religious War
Another factor that complicates intractable
conflicts is the politicization of religion by each side. Rouhana
and Bar-Tal write, “There is a danger that for growing segments of the
population, the conflict can become a clash of religious doctrines in
which the possibility of reconciliation becomes unimaginable and that
can, therefore, lead to an unending contest of religiously motivated
wills.”[43]
For each side in the U.S. – Al Qaeda conflict, the opposition is viewed
as a violator of religious and moral law, while the opposing religion
itself is de-legitimized. Therefore, the real danger is not just the
clash of religious doctrines, but that each side is able to dehumanize
the other and find religious justification for annihilating the other’s
people, innocent or not. As Rouhana and Bar-Tal note, “The opponent is
categorized into extreme negative social categories which are excluded
from human groups…they also justify one’s own hostile acts.”[44]
As previously noted, basic tenets of Wahhabi
Islam allow for the use of excessive violence for the proliferation of
faith. In February of 1998, Osama bin Laden issued an edict calling on
Muslims “to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and
military…”[45]
Bin Laden uses religious ideology to support his call for war. He
clarifies, “…in our religion it is our duty to make jihad so that God’s
word is the one exalted to the heights…”[46]
He concludes his remarks with a bold plea: “We – with God’s help – call
on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply
with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever
and whenever they find it.” Like Bush, bin Laden polarizes the conflict
between those Muslims who believe in God, and those who do not. Cleverly
framing his language in this way, bin Laden attempts to enforce a
universal religious cause for war among the larger Muslim community.
President Bush also uses religion to tell the
story of the attacks. Shortly after the attacks, in late September of
2001, he informed the American people, “We are the target of enemies who
boast they want to kill – kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill
all Christians. We've seen that type of hate before – and the only
possible response is to confront it, and to defeat it.”[47]
The effectiveness of Bush’s description lies in how he reverses bin
Laden’s logic. By “defeat” Bush is obviously referring to military
action, yet he is able to convincingly justify this perspective by
portraying Al Qaeda as the group that manipulates religion for its own
causes.
In speeches given in the six months after the
attacks, Bush continued to claim the support of God for the American
cause. His words to the nation on September 20 were intensely religious:
The course of this
conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear,
justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is
not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with
patient justice – assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident
of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us
wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.[48]
The politicization of religion by Al Qaeda and
the U.S. entrenches the conflict in spiritual, emotional and moral
values. With each side claiming the support of God, they are
respectively allowed to war with God’s blessing. Each group supports the
idea that God chooses sides, and that, in this conflict, God has chosen
their side, meaning that God has rejected the opposition. Significantly,
these narratives hold that God supports the conflict itself, rather than
supporting peace. These leaders seem to be relying on respective
populations not to question conflicts that are religiously supported and
maintained.
Conclusion: No Chance for Peace
According to Rouhana and Bar-Tal, when national
narratives are propagated by each side of an ethnonational conflict, the
opportunity for peace and understanding remains limited.[49]
Muslims, especially Wahhabi Muslims, continue to view the U.S. as a
global terror that uses military force in the name of democracy and
freedom. Americans perceive Al Qaeda as terrorists that use military
force in the name of fundamentalist religious values. Both groups
maintain that innocent victims suffer needlessly because of the other.
Furthermore, while each group admits to using violence, that violence is
seen as retaliatory and justified. Additionally, there exists the
perception of irreconcilability. This point is enhanced by the fact
that neither side has admitted any wrongdoing. More importantly, there
remains significant confusion and disagreement as to the exact causes
of the conflict. Indeed, as previously noted, the political causes of
the attacks remain a mystery to many in the U.S.
Lastly, Rouhana and Bar-Tal explain that societal
beliefs hold up the conflict as irreconcilable. They outline that in an
intractable conflict each side believes that “Our goals are just,” We
can do no wrong,” and that “We are the victims.”[50]
According to the respective national narratives, Americans see
themselves as innocent victims of terror and radical Islam, while many
Muslims perceive themselves as innocent victims of American military
domination and double-standard foreign policy. Presently, Americans look
to the capture of Osama bin Laden, military presence in the Middle East
and increased homeland security as potential “solutions” to the
conflict. Meanwhile, there remains no reason to doubt that Al Qaeda will
continue its terrorist activities. The difficulty with analyzing
peaceful prospects in this conflict is that neither side has even
mentioned peace as a possibility, a fact that ensures these one-sided
narratives will continue to uphold the conflict for years to come.
Endnotes
Source for this article:
http://www.gse.harvard.edu/~t656_web/peace/Articles_Spring_2003/Gagnon_Jeffrey_USalQaedaConflict.htm#_edn16
[1]
Rouhana, N. N., & Bar-Tal, D. (1998).
Psychological dynamics of intractable ethnonational conflicts.
The Israeli Palestinian case. American Psychologist, 53(7),
761-770. See p. 763.
[2]
Council, F.R. (2003). Terrorism: Questions &
Answers. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World
Wide Web: http://www.terrorismanswers.com/home/
[4]
Council, F.R., 2003; Monterey, I.I.S., 2002
[5]
Council, F.R., 2003; Monterey, I.I.S., 2002
[6]
Council, F.R., 2003; Monterey, I.I.S., 2002
[8]
Gold, D, 2003, chapter 1
[16]
(Former UN Ambassador)Gold,
p. 5
[18]
Frontline. (2001). Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.: Edicts and
Statements. Frontline [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from
the World Wide Web:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/
[19]
Frontline, Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.
[20]
Miller, J. (1999). “Greetings, America. My Name is Osama Bin
Laden…” Frontline [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the
World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/
[21]
The Middle East Media, R.I. (455) (2003). Interview With Afghan
Leader on Jihad Against U.S. Middle East Media Research
Institute: Special Dispatch Series. 2003, January 6.
[Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP45503
[22]
The Middle East Media, R.I. (455)
[23]
The Middle East Media, R.I. (455)
[24]
Rouhana and Bar Tal, 1998, p. 763
[26]
Sardar & Davies, pp. 9-10
[27]
Sardar & Davies, pp. 9-10
[28]
Sardar & Davies, pp. 9-10
[30]
Sardar & Davies, introduction
[31]
Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 765
[32]
Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 765
[33]
Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 765
[34]
Bush, G.W. (September 11, 2001). Statement by the President in
His Address to the Nation. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003,
from the World Wide Web: http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/pk1/wwwhbush2.html
[35]
Bush, G.W. (September 11, 2001)
[37]
Bush, G.W. (November 2001)
[38]
Terror, I.A. (30). (2001). Retrospective: A bin Laden Special on
Al-Jazeera Two Months Before September 11. Middle East Media
Research Institute: Special Dispatch Series. 2001
December 21, 319. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the
World Wide Web:
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP31901
[39]
Terror, I.A. (30). (2001).
[43]
Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764
[44]
Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764
[45]
Frontline. (2001). Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.: Edicts and
Statements. Frontline [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from
the World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/
[46]
Frontline, Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.
[48]
Bush, G.W. (September 2001)
[49]
Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764
[50]
Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764
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