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It’s All Your Fault

Understanding the U.S. – Al Qaeda Conflict

Jeffrey Gagnon, May 2003

Introduction

Writing about the psychological dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Rouhana and Bar-Tal acknowledge the unlikelihood of resolution due to the current clash of national narratives. They write, “The narratives of the two communities in conflict are in total clash as to the root causes of the conflict, the meaning of the historical developments, and the role played by the in-group and the out-group during the various stages of the dispute.”[1] Elaborating on this point, these authors argue that societal beliefs about the national narrative allow each side to prolong the conflict while complicating the possibility for long-term peace.

The purpose of this analysis is to examine the U.S. - Al Qaeda conflict to explore how each narrative sustains the conflict and challenges the possibility for peace. Even though Rouhana and Bar-Tal examine the Palestinian-Israeli struggle as an example of an intractable ethnonational conflict, many of the characteristics they highlight also apply to the conflict between the United States and the fundamentalist Islamic group, Al Qaeda. Various publications from the United States and the Middle East reveal that each side has created strong and stubborn societal beliefs about the history, origin and purpose of the conflict. Each side vilifies the other as evil, unjust and irresponsible, while perceiving themselves as innocent victims of aggression and unnecessary violence. While Rouhana and Bar-Tal consider national narratives to be of chief importance in how each side constructs societal beliefs, they also consider how each side fashions the narrative to suit their respective histories, intentions and goals. These elements strongly frame both the American version and Al Qaeda’s account of the conflict; therefore, each will be compared through this analysis.

The two opposing sides in this conflict are defined as the U.S. government and Al Qaeda. It is important to note that both the American and Muslim populations have been distinctly divided over the perspectives and goals of this conflict. Therefore, all claims attributed to the “American” national narrative will be limited to the perspective of the U.S. government. With regard to Al Qaeda, its members are comprised of Wahhabi Muslims who practice a particular form of Islam. In this investigation, all claims attributed to “Muslims” refer to Wahhabi Muslims.

In describing any national narrative, sources that attempt to tell the story play a crucial role. In this case, principal support for the American version of events is taken from American media sources and excerpts from the speeches of President Bush. From the Al Qaeda viewpoint, sources have been taken from Middle Eastern media journalism translated into English, as well as from excerpts of interviews given by Osama bin Laden before the events of September 11.

Origin of the Conflict: Al Qaeda Narrative

The origins and perceptions of the goals of the conflict remains greatly disputed between the two sides. According to interviews and articles published online at The Middle East Media Research Institute, Al Qaeda’s narrative claims the attacks on September 11 were caused in part by three main issues. The first issue centers on an enduring U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, beginning during the first Gulf War. The second issue results from hypocritical U.S. foreign policy that has attempted to colonize the Middle East to protect oil interests. Lastly, Al Qaeda remains angered over U.S. political, economic and military support of Israeli attacks on innocent Muslims in Palestine, as well as U.S.–led sanctions against Iraqi civilians after the Gulf War. [2]

While these three issues represent the central concerns of Al Qaeda, the mystery of Al Qaeda’s own history and mission requires clarification. Who are they, where are they from and what are their goals? Al Qaeda, sometimes spelled al Qaida, which means “the Base,” was started in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, who was working to oust the Soviet army from Afghanistan.[3] The name reportedly comes from bin Laden’s house in Afghanistan, which was used as a command post for incoming Muslim fighters reporting to battle.[4] Al Qaeda is comprised of Muslims from all over the Middle East and all over the world. They have been funded, trained and organized by Osama bin Laden, a former Saudi Arabian citizen who inherited a vast fortune from his father.[5] Research on the number of Al Qaeda members has yielded an estimate of between 2,500 and 3,000, scattered worldwide.[6]

The roots of Al Qaeda’s religious beliefs and mission can be found in the teachings of Wahhabism, a fundamentalist form of Islam. Dore Gold, the Israeli author of Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, maintains that the roots of Al Qaeda and the story of 9-11 begin with the formation of Wahhabism.[7] According to Gold, Wahhabism is an extreme form of the traditional Islam practiced widely across the Middle East.[8] Wahhabi Islam was initiated on the Arabian Peninsula in the mid-eighteenth century by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.[9] Retreating to the strictest and most fundamental teachings of Islam, ibn Abdul Wahhab endorsed violence, murder and war in the name of Islam[10] Wahhab felt that the Islam of the late eighteenth century was corrupt and unfaithful to traditional Islamic teachings. Setting the stage for Al Qaeda’s perception of the U.S., Wahhab saw foreigners, especially Europeans, as enemies who could potentially dominate the Arabian Peninsula.[11]

Wahhabism departed from classical Islam, which forbade the spread of the religion through force.[12] Wahhabi Islam restored the concept of Jihad (literally, “struggle,” but now translated as “holy war”) and began a harsh campaign of violence and war across the peninsula.[13] Under classical Islam, anyone who died in a Jihad became a shahid, or martyr (literally, witness) and was instantly welcomed by God into Paradise.[14] Throughout its history Wahhabism has been strongly opposed to anyone, Muslim or non-Muslim, who has not adopted its teachings and principles.[15] Presently, Wahhabi fundamentalism is taught at Madinah University in Saudi Arabia. Madinah graduated fifteen of the Saudis who participated in the September 11 hijackings, as well as Osama bin Laden.[16] Thus, Al Qaeda’s members perceive the conflict through the lens of Wahhabism and view the U.S. not only as political enemies but as religious ones as well.

Politically, Al Qaeda maintains that the conflict began in 1989, on the eve of the first Gulf War. The Saudi government granted the U.S. military permission to construct bases from which to attack Iraq. Saudi Arabia, fearing an attack from Iraq through Kuwait, welcomed the U.S. presence as a military protector. Bin Laden and all Wahhabi clerics denounced this decision, claiming that Western military forces were invaders and infidels on Holy Land.[17] In 1996, bin Laden wrote the “Declaration of War Against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” subtitled “Expel the Infidels from the Arabian Peninsula.”[18] Two years later, in 1998, bin Laden called for a “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.”[19] He wrote, “For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian peninsula.”[20] From the Al Qaeda perspective, the U.S. should not have been allowed on Saudi soil, nor should it have used that position to attack another Muslim country.

The second cause for war, according to the Al Qaeda narrative, is American foreign policy in the Middle East. Outraged, bin Laden lashed out at his perception of American policy as imperialistic and hypocritical:

The American imposes himself on everyone… By the testimony of relief workers in Iraq, the American-led sanctions resulted in the death of more than one million Iraqi children. All of this is done in the name of American interests…We believe that the biggest thieves in the world and the terrorists are the Americans.[21]

The Al Qaeda narrative emotionally positions the American government as colonialists and political bullies. From Al Qaeda’s perspective, the U.S. appears to be dominant and imposing. Afghan Islamic leader Gulboddin Hekmatyar spoke out against U.S. (and Western) foreign policy in the Middle East, claiming that Westerners believe their civilization to be superior to all others and will go to any lengths to achieve that dominance. He wrote, “They are trying to impose their way of life on the poor peoples.”[22] Hekmatyar placed the responsibility for this attitude on the American government and U.S. Congress, claiming that the government hides its intentions from the American people.[23] He believes that the U.S. intentionally misrepresents its foreign policy to its own people. Hekmatyar also implies that the U.S fashions its own conflict narrative for selfish purposes.

The danger with Al Qaeda’s narrative is that it positions all of the blame and responsibility on the American government, which suggests that the conflict can only be resolved if the American government changes its policies. Furthermore, this narrative puts Al Qaeda in the position of having to force or coerce the U.S. into ending the conflict by changing its foreign policy. As such, the conflict is deepened and the possibility of peace appears remote.

Origin of the Conflict: U.S. Narrative

Rouhana and Bar-Tal insist that the main essence of an intractable conflict centers on the interpretation of facts as they pertain to names, rhetoric, main actors, causes and responsibilities.[24] While Al Qaeda positions the U.S. as instigators of the conflict, the American government has constructed a vastly different narrative. To begin with, the U.S. narrative maintains that the conflict began on 9-11. Indeed, when President Bush first introduced the nation to the name “Al Qaeda” in a speech following the attacks, most Americans were hearing that name for the first time. Moreover, in the days and weeks following the 9-11 attacks, Americans asked, “Why do they hate us?” As pointed out by Sardar and Davies in their post-September 11 analysis, Why Do People Hate America?, the root of this question is more complex than it seems because it positions America as the victim of unprovoked violence, rather than as part of a relational conflict. Several weeks after 9–11, President Bush spoke of foreign animosity toward the nation: “We must never forget this will be a long struggle, that there are evil people in the world who hate America.”[25] But according to Americans, exactly who hates America and why do they hate? What is the U.S. version of this story?

It is difficult to compile concrete U.S. – perceived reasons for the attacks of 9-11. Much of the U.S. analysis stands behind vaguely defined philosophical and political reasons for Al Qaeda’s attacks, including opposition to freedom, democracy and the U.S. way of life. Supporting this view, in his September 11 Address to the Nation, President Bush offered a brief cause for the attacks: “America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” In a poll conducted by a Paris-based newspaper, the International Herald Tribune, 90% of U.S. respondents identified their country’s power and wealth as reasons for international anger and resentment.[26] In the same poll, only 18% of U.S. respondents blamed the government’s foreign policy.[27] As Sardar and Davies write, “Most Americans are simply not aware of the impact of their culture and their government’s policies on the rest of the world. But, more important, a vast majority simply do not believe that America has done, or can do, anything wrong.”[28]

As pointed out by journalist Daniel Pipes, the overall vagueness of the opposition only complicates the way Americans speak about the attacks. Instead of referring to Wahhabi Islam or militant Islam, the enemies are “terrorists” which, “is a tactic, not an enemy.”[29] Leaving the enemy without a name or face, other than the face of Osama bin Laden, removes the opportunity to learn about Al Qaeda’s cause, culture, mission and history. Additionally, the vague references to Islamic extremism or Islamic fundamentalism confuse those Americans who are unable to differentiate between the many forms of Islam practiced around the world.

In carrying out the “War on Terror,” the Bush administration has not offered the American public any specific answers as to the cause of the attacks. Motives that were widely discussed in the media in the days and weeks following 9-11 include: disrupting the American economy, destroying important American governmental and economic symbols, as well as instilling fear in the hearts and minds of American citizens. After the attacks, most Americans failed to inquire as to the social and political ideology of the attackers, while the government remained silent on this issue. As evidence of this American mindset, Sardar and Davies lament that the horrific events of 9-11 have not resulted in a deep and systematic investigation into the causes of the attacks. They argue that “The events of 9-11 have not prompted diligent inquiry and serious debate, but a resort to the very agenda that constructs the problem of relations between America and the rest of the world in the first place.”[30]

Considering the overall lack of critical inquiry and the vaguely defined causes of conflict, the U.S. narrative not only sustains the conflict, it also discourages deeper analysis of the conflict itself. By maintaining the position that the war began when the planes were hijacked, Americans indulge in framing themselves unambiguously as victims of unprovoked violence. This position excludes the American government from taking any responsibility for the conflict’s origins, an act that sustains the war itself.

The Opponent has No Legitimacy

Rouhana and Bar-Tal explain that during intractable conflicts, each side disregards the claims and beliefs of the other.[31] By denying the legitimacy of the opposition’s narrative, each side is able to dehumanize, disregard and negatively label the other. They contend, “Thus, the opponent is categorized ‘into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within limits of acceptable norms and/or values’.”[32] From this perspective, each side is able to justify aggression and violence while removing itself from blame and responsibility. Instead, each side can blame the cause and continuation of the conflict on the opponent.[33]

The use of language plays a major role in this prolonging this conflict. Each side describes the other as evil. They also clash regarding the use of the word terrorism. By vilifying one another using these terms, each side is able to claim moral superiority and righteousness.

In his September 11 address, President Bush framed the American narrative in binary terms. “Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature…Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.”[34] In describing the conflict and subtly justifying retribution, Bush declared, “This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail.”[35] By painting the picture of the conflict as “good vs. evil,” President Bush claimed the moral high ground for the U.S. narrative. This view also supports the image of Americans as innocent victims of evil acts. Once again, the U.S. is able to relinquish responsibility for the conflict. Furthermore, the connotation of evil dehumanizes the hijackers, Osama bin Laden and all of Al Qaeda. The use of the word evil suggests irrational hatred and violence. Seen as evil, Al Qaeda is fully removed from having legitimate political and philosophical reasons for attacking the U.S. Instead, members of Al Qaeda are reduced to “evildoers” – those who commit violence only for the sake of violence.

In a post-9-11 speech, President Bush also shaped the conflict in rigidly dichotomous terms:

This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims.[36]

This description of the conflict is problematic for a variety of reasons. Once again, the U.S. is portrayed as morally just, politically fair and democratically free. In contrast, Al Qaeda is painted in the worst possible terms. Going even further, President Bush called on America to champion even higher purposes, declaring, We wage a war to save civilization, itself. We did not seek it, but we must fight it - and we will prevail.”[37] Describing Al Qaeda as destroyers of civilization ultimately justifies any military action the U.S. takes.

As for Al Qaeda’s use of language in perpetuating the conflict, Abd Al-Bari Atwan, an Arabic-language journalist based in London and regularly featured on al-Jazeera, called President Bush, “evil,” “reckless,” and “thirsty for bloodshed.”[38] Atwan compared Bush to Hitler and implored, “…the entire world must act to stop him and to put an end to his recklessness, before he drowns in destructive wars that will make the first and second world wars seem modest.”[39] Atwan’s comments mimic President Bush’s, in that they portray Bush as evil, irrational and unpredictably violent. Comparing Bush to Hitler is extreme and unfair. However, the intention of the comparison is to instill fear in the Wahhabi population and to encourage proactive aggression to avoid destruction. Atwan’s plea also accomplishes the same goal as Bush’s – he portrays Bush as irrationally violent, thus removing responsibility for the conflict from the hands of Al Qaeda.

The use of the terrorist label has also conjured significant debate between the two groups. According to McCauley and Segal, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”[40] U.S. rhetoric surrounding the attacks continues to label the perpetrators as terrorists. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda leaders denounce the label, maintaining that it is a word conjured by the American government to frame the narrative in its own best interests. In a 1998 interview with ABC reporter John Miller, Osama bin Laden stated, “Americans accuse our children in Palestine of being terrorists – those children, who have no weapons and have not even reached maturity. At the same time, Americans defend a country, the state of the Jews that has a policy to destroy the future of these children.”[41]

These comments reflect differences concerning the definitions of terrorism and terrorist. They also reveal a frustration with America’s power to define who is a terrorist and which acts constitute terrorism. The scope of American mass media ensures that American definitions and labels in this conflict powerfully influence both narratives. Regardless of the accuracy of the terms, Al Qaeda leaders are angered by the U.S.’s ability to reframe its own violence and military aggression in more positive terms. An example of this can be found in President Bush’s address in October of 2001, “We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today's military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.”[42] Through this statement, Americans are able to perceive retributive acts of violence in highly moralistic, dignified terms. These clashing perspectives reinforce the power of language in creating a national narrative that sustains conflict.

Religious War

Another factor that complicates intractable conflicts is the politicization of religion by each side. Rouhana and Bar-Tal write, “There is a danger that for growing segments of the population, the conflict can become a clash of religious doctrines in which the possibility of reconciliation becomes unimaginable and that can, therefore, lead to an unending contest of religiously motivated wills.”[43] For each side in the U.S. – Al Qaeda conflict, the opposition is viewed as a violator of religious and moral law, while the opposing religion itself is de-legitimized. Therefore, the real danger is not just the clash of religious doctrines, but that each side is able to dehumanize the other and find religious justification for annihilating the other’s people, innocent or not. As Rouhana and Bar-Tal note, “The opponent is categorized into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups…they also justify one’s own hostile acts.”[44]

As previously noted, basic tenets of Wahhabi Islam allow for the use of excessive violence for the proliferation of faith. In February of 1998, Osama bin Laden issued an edict calling on Muslims “to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military…”[45] Bin Laden uses religious ideology to support his call for war. He clarifies, “…in our religion it is our duty to make jihad so that God’s word is the one exalted to the heights…”[46] He concludes his remarks with a bold plea: “We – with God’s help – call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.” Like Bush, bin Laden polarizes the conflict between those Muslims who believe in God, and those who do not. Cleverly framing his language in this way, bin Laden attempts to enforce a universal religious cause for war among the larger Muslim community.

President Bush also uses religion to tell the story of the attacks. Shortly after the attacks, in late September of 2001, he informed the American people, “We are the target of enemies who boast they want to kill – kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians. We've seen that type of hate before – and the only possible response is to confront it, and to defeat it.”[47] The effectiveness of Bush’s description lies in how he reverses bin Laden’s logic. By “defeat” Bush is obviously referring to military action, yet he is able to convincingly justify this perspective by portraying Al Qaeda as the group that manipulates religion for its own causes.

In speeches given in the six months after the attacks, Bush continued to claim the support of God for the American cause. His words to the nation on September 20 were intensely religious:

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice – assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.[48]

The politicization of religion by Al Qaeda and the U.S. entrenches the conflict in spiritual, emotional and moral values. With each side claiming the support of God, they are respectively allowed to war with God’s blessing. Each group supports the idea that God chooses sides, and that, in this conflict, God has chosen their side, meaning that God has rejected the opposition. Significantly, these narratives hold that God supports the conflict itself, rather than supporting peace. These leaders seem to be relying on respective populations not to question conflicts that are religiously supported and maintained.

Conclusion: No Chance for Peace

According to Rouhana and Bar-Tal, when national narratives are propagated by each side of an ethnonational conflict, the opportunity for peace and understanding remains limited.[49] Muslims, especially Wahhabi Muslims, continue to view the U.S. as a global terror that uses military force in the name of democracy and freedom. Americans perceive Al Qaeda as terrorists that use military force in the name of fundamentalist religious values. Both groups maintain that innocent victims suffer needlessly because of the other. Furthermore, while each group admits to using violence, that violence is seen as retaliatory and justified. Additionally, there exists the perception of irreconcilability. This point is enhanced by the fact that neither side has admitted any wrongdoing. More importantly, there remains significant confusion and disagreement as to the exact causes of the conflict. Indeed, as previously noted, the political causes of the attacks remain a mystery to many in the U.S.

Lastly, Rouhana and Bar-Tal explain that societal beliefs hold up the conflict as irreconcilable. They outline that in an intractable conflict each side believes that “Our goals are just,” We can do no wrong,” and that “We are the victims.”[50] According to the respective national narratives, Americans see themselves as innocent victims of terror and radical Islam, while many Muslims perceive themselves as innocent victims of American military domination and double-standard foreign policy. Presently, Americans look to the capture of Osama bin Laden, military presence in the Middle East and increased homeland security as potential “solutions” to the conflict. Meanwhile, there remains no reason to doubt that Al Qaeda will continue its terrorist activities. The difficulty with analyzing peaceful prospects in this conflict is that neither side has even mentioned peace as a possibility, a fact that ensures these one-sided narratives will continue to uphold the conflict for years to come.

Endnotes

 Source for this article: http://www.gse.harvard.edu/~t656_web/peace/Articles_Spring_2003/Gagnon_Jeffrey_USalQaedaConflict.htm#_edn16
[1] Rouhana, N. N., & Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Psychological dynamics of intractable ethnonational conflicts. The Israeli Palestinian case. American Psychologist, 53(7), 761-770. See p. 763.

[2] Council, F.R. (2003). Terrorism: Questions & Answers. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.terrorismanswers.com/home/

[3] Council, F.R., 2003; See also, Monterey, I.I.S. (2002. Al-Qaida. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/alqaida.htm

[4] Council, F.R., 2003; Monterey, I.I.S., 2002

[5] Council, F.R., 2003; Monterey, I.I.S., 2002

[6] Council, F.R., 2003; Monterey, I.I.S., 2002

[7]  Gold, D. (2003). Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc. see chapter 1

[8] Gold, D, 2003, chapter 1

[9] Gold, chapter 2

[10] Gold, chapter 2

[11] Gold, chapter 2

[12] Gold, chapter 2

[13] Gold, pp. 6-8

[14] Gold, pp. 7

[15] Gold, chapter 1

[16] (Former UN Ambassador)Gold, p. 5

[17] Gold, chapter 9

[18] Frontline. (2001). Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.: Edicts and Statements. Frontline [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/

[19] Frontline, Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.

[20] Miller, J. (1999). “Greetings, America. My Name is Osama Bin Laden…” Frontline [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/

[21] The Middle East Media, R.I. (455) (2003). Interview With Afghan Leader on Jihad Against U.S. Middle East Media Research Institute: Special Dispatch Series. 2003, January 6. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP45503

[22] The Middle East Media, R.I. (455)

[23] The Middle East Media, R.I. (455)

[24] Rouhana and Bar Tal, 1998, p. 763

[25] Sardar Z. & Davies, M. (2002). Why Do People Hate America? New York, NY: The Disinformation Company Ltd.

[26] Sardar & Davies, pp. 9-10

[27] Sardar & Davies, pp. 9-10

[28] Sardar & Davies, pp. 9-10

[29] Pipes, D. (2001). What Bush got right – and wrong. Jerusalem Post, 2001 September 26. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/70.

[30] Sardar & Davies, introduction

[31] Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 765

[32] Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 765

[33] Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 765

[34] Bush, G.W. (September 11, 2001). Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/pk1/wwwhbush2.html

[35] Bush, G.W. (September 11, 2001)

[36] Bush, G.W. (November 2001). President's Address to the Nation. November 8, 2001. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.bushcountry.org/bush_speeches/president_bush_speeches_index.htm

[37] Bush, G.W. (November 2001)

[38] Terror, I.A. (30). (2001). Retrospective: A bin Laden Special on Al-Jazeera Two Months Before September 11. Middle East Media Research Institute: Special Dispatch Series. 2001 December 21, 319. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP31901

[39] Terror, I.A. (30). (2001).

[40] McCauley, C. R., & Segal, M. E. (1987). Social psychology of terrorist groups. In C. Hendrick (Ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 9, pp. 231-256). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

[41] Miller, J. (1999). “Greetings, America. My Name is Osama Bin Laden…” Frontline [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/.

[42] Bush, G.W. (October 2001). Presidential Address. October 7, 2001. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.bushcountry.org/bush_speeches/president_bush_speeches_index.htm

[43] Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764

[44] Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764

[45] Frontline. (2001). Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.: Edicts and Statements. Frontline [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/

[46] Frontline, Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.

[47] Bush, G.W. (September 2001). Speech to the Joint Session of Congress. September 20, 2001. [Website]. Retrieved April 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.bushcountry.org/bush_speeches/president_bush_speeches_index.htm

[48] Bush, G.W. (September 2001)

[49] Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764

[50] Rouhana and Bar-Tal, p. 764

 


               

 

 

 

 

 

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